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Abstract. In this paper, we formalize a prediction of Klemperer and Meyer
(1989) as to the possibility that in the presence of demand uncertainty the
expected profits under the supply function competition may result in higher
expected oligopoly profits than under the stochastic Cournot competition and
investigate how this possibility is affected by certain attributes of the oligopolis-
tic industry, such as the number of firms, the cost of producing a unit output,
and the slope of the demand curve.
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1 Introduction
Economists have long criticized Cournot’s (1838) oligopolistic competition model
for not allowing firms the flexibility to adjust their output in the face of unantic-
ipated demand shocks. A more sophisticated model was proposed by Grossman
(1981), according to whom firms can commit to -instead of fixed quantities of
outputs- supply functions specifying the quantity to be supplied as a function
of the price. However, Grossman (1981) also showed that -in the absence of
any type of uncertainties- oligopolistic games with supply function competition
may result in a huge multiplicity of pure-strategy equilibria with respect to the
noncooperative solution of Nash (1950). Even a more annoying fact is that
in the absence of any uncertainties, the competition in supply functions might
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become meaningless in the first place, since all equilibria of supply functions
always yield, for each firm, the same profit maximizing quantity of supply (and
price), which could have been directly chosen without using any supply function
and without incurring any costs due to building a sufficient capacity to credibly
commit to a supply function.
However, these arguments against the supply function competition may dis-
appear under some additional assumptions about the demand or cost curves or
under some changes in the equilibrium concept, as was shown by Klemperer and
Meyer (1989), Delgado and Moreno (2004), Delgado (2006), and Kro´l (2017).
The modification devised by Klemperer and Meyer (1989) was to introduce
-to the oligopolistic industry- an exogenous demand uncertainty with an un-
bounded support. In their model, firms simultaneously choose supply functions
without knowing the realization of the demand shock/uncertainty. Right after
they learn the realization of the uncertainty (hence, the actual position of the
demand curve) begins the production stage, where firms can calculate -using
the supply functions they chose in the previous stage- a market clearing price
and their actual supplies implied by this price. Since each possible realization
of the demand curve implies a distinct profit maximizing quantity of supply, the
ability of firms to commit, through supply functions, to all possible realizations
of the profit maximizing quantities (and all possible market clearing prices) can
protect them against the uncertainties they might face. Also, the number (or
the measure) of the supply function equilibria would be significantly reduced in
the presence of demand uncertainty, because the supply function of each firm
would need to pass through not a single but a multiplicity of profit maximizing
quantities, each of which corresponding to a distinct realization of the demand
curve. In fact, the uncertainty in demand can even ensure the uniqueness of
equilibrium if the demand curve and the marginal cost curve of each firm become
linear when the price and the supply become sufficiently large.
More recently, Delgado and Moreno (2004) and Delgado (2006), who followed
a different path from that of Klemperer and Meyer (1989), realized that if the
Nash equilibrium concept is changed with the coalition-proof equilibrium and if
some additional conditions hold, not only the uniqueness of the supply function
equilibria can be ensured in a deterministic oligopoly but also this unique equi-
librium and the Cournot competition can lead to the same outcome. On the
other hand, Kro´l (2017) formalized an insight of Klemperer and Meyer (1989)
to show that the enormous multiplicity of the supply function equilibria can be
reduced in the absence of any uncertainties as well if different supply functions
have different costs of implementation. Specifically, Kro´l (2017) showed that
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when excess capacity is always costly, there is even a one-to-one correspondence
between the sets of Nash equilibria, and also (under some additional condi-
tions about the industry) between the sets of strategies surviving the iterated
elimination of weakly dominated strategies.
An important result of Klemperer and Meyer (1989), distinguishing it from
the subsequent works discussed above, is that the set of supply function equilib-
ria under the demand uncertainty can never boil down to the Cournot equilibria
of a non-stochastic industry. As a matter of fact, Klemperer and Meyer (1989)
showed that for any realization of the demand uncertainty, the equilibrium quan-
tities of supply become always higher, and consequently the equilibrium profits
become always lower, under the supply function competition with demand un-
certainty than under the Cournot competition without uncertainties. However,
they also predicted that when an uncertain demand curve is linear in price and
resultingly the supply function competition leads to a unique equilibrium, the
expected profits at this equilibrium may be higher than the expected profits
obtained under the stochastic Cournot competition where firms choose their
supply quantities before observing the realization of the demand uncertainty.
The reason they offer is that only under the supply function competition do
firms adjust optimally to every possible realization of the demand uncertainty.
In this paper, we formalize this prediction of Klemperer and Meyer (1989) as
to the possibility of the supply function competition with demand uncertainty
resulting in higher expected oligopoly profits than obtained under the stochastic
Cournot competition and investigate how this possibility is affected by certain
attributes of the oligopolistic industry, involving the number of firms, the cost
of producing a unit output, and the slope of the demand curve.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces a simple
model of an oligopolistic industry with demand uncertainty. Sections 3 and 4
present for this model the stochastic versions of the supply function competition
and the Cournot competition respectively. Section 5 contains our results and
finally Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
Borrowing from Klemperer and Meyer (1989), we consider an oligopolistic in-
dustry involving n ≥ 2 firms who produce a single homogenous good. The firms
have identical cost functions such that each firm producing a quantity of output
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q incurs the cost
C(q) = cq2/2 for all q ≥ 0, (1)
where c > 0. The industry demand curve is given by
D(p, ) = −mp+ , (2)
where p ≥ 0 is the market price of the good, m > 0 and  ∈ [0,∞). The form of
the cost and demand curves, C(q) and D(p, ), as well as the cost and demand
parameters c and m are assumed to be commonly known by the firms. On the
other hand,  is a scalar random variable with a probability density f() that is
strictly positive everywhere on the support [0,∞). It is also assumed that there
is common knowledge about f(.).
3 Supply Function Competition with Demand
Uncertainty
A strategy for firm i is a function mapping price into a quantity of output for
this firm, i.e., Si : [0,∞) → (−∞,∞). In the pre-production stage, firms si-
multaneously choose supply functions without knowing the realization of the
demand variable . Right after they learn the realization of  begins the pro-
duction stage, where firms calculate -using the supply functions they chose in
the previous stage- a market clearing price p¯() that satisfies
n∑
i=1
Si(p¯()) = D(p¯(), ). (3)
If this price exists and if it is unique, then the actual outputs (Si(p¯()))ni=1 are
produced. Otherwise, each firm earns zero profits.
For the game played in the first stage of the above setup we focus on the
Nash equilibria in supply functions as in Grossman (1981) and Klemperer and
Meyer (1989). We say that a profile (list) of supply functions (S¯i(p))ni=1 is a
Nash equilibrium if for each firm i the function S¯i(p) maximizes its expected
profits when all of the remaining firms stick to their supply functions in the
considered profile. That is, for each i the function S¯i(p) solves
max
S(p)
E
p(D(p, )−∑
j 6=i
S¯j(p)
)
− C
(
D(p, )−
∑
j 6=i
S¯j(p)
) , (4)
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where E denotes the expectations operator under the probability density func-
tion f() over  ∈ [0,∞).
Proposition 1 (Klemperer and Meyer, 1989). For the model described in
Section 2, the supply function competition with demand uncertainty has a unique
Nash equilibrium profile of supply functions characterized by
S¯i(p) = αp, for all i, (5)
where
α =
−m+ n− 2
c
+
√(
−m+ n− 2
c
)2
+
4m (n− 1)
c
2(n− 1) . (6)
Proof. See the proof of Proposition 8a in Klemperer and Meyer (1989). 
Using the equilibrium supply functions characterized by (5) and (6), the
demand function in (2), and the market clearing condition in (3), we can cal-
culate for any realization of  the corresponding market clearing price and the
equilibrium quantities as
p¯() =

nα+m
(7)
and
S¯i(p¯()) = q¯() =
α
nα+m
for all i. (8)
It follows that for any realization of , the ‘realized’ profits of each firm will be
identical and equal to
p¯i() = p¯()q¯()− cq¯()2/2 = α
2
(nα+m)2
(
1− cα
2
)
. (9)
On the other hand, before the firms learn the realization of the demand uncer-
tainty, the equilibrium profit they expect to earn can be calculated by applying
the expectations operator E[.] to both sides of the above equation, yielding
E[p¯i()] =
α
(nα+m)2
(
1− cα
2
)
E[2]. (10)
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4 Cournot Competition with Demand Uncer-
tainty
A strategy for firm i is a nonnegative quantity of output, qi ∈ [0,∞). So, let
us write the expected profits of firm i as a function of qi. Let Q denote the
industry output; i.e., Q =
∑n
i=1 q
i. Inverting (2), we obtain the inverse demand
function P (Q, ) ≡ D−1(Q, ) as follows:
P (Q, ) =

m
− Q
m
, (11)
for any Q ≥ 0. Using this, we can write the expected profits of firm i as follows:
E
P(qi +∑
j 6=i
qj , 
)
qi − C(qi)
 (12)
Firms are assumed to simultaneously choose and implement their supplies with-
out knowing the realization of the uncertain demand variable . In this game
we focus on the (Cournot) Nash equilibria in quantities. We say that a pro-
file of quantities (qˆi)ni=1 is a Nash equilibrium if for each firm i the quantity
qˆi maximizes its expected profits when all of the remaining firms stick to their
quantities in the considered profile. That is, for each i the quantity qˆi solves
max
q
E
P(qi +∑
j 6=i
qˆj , 
)
qi − C(qi)
 . (13)
Proposition 2. For the model described in Section 2, the Cournot competition
with demand uncertainty has a unique Nash equilibrium profile of quantities
characterized by
qˆi =
E[]
n+ 1 +mc
for all i. (14)
Proof. Inserting (1) and (11) into (12), we can rewrite the expected profits of
firm i as
E[pii()] =
E[]
m
− 1
m
qi +∑
j 6=i
qj
 qi − c
2
(qi)2. (15)
Differentiating (15) with respect to qi we obtain the first-order necessary con-
dition
E[]
m
− 1
m
2qi +∑
j 6=i
qj
− cqi = 0, (16)
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which implies the following best-response (reaction) function for firm i:
qi =
1
2 +mc
E[]−∑
j 6=i
qj
 (17)
Since the reaction functions of the firms are symmetric, we must have qˆj = qˆi
for all j 6= i in equilibrium. Inserting this into (17) we obtain
qˆi =
1
2 +mc
(
E[]− (n− 1)qˆi) . (18)
Solving for qˆi yields equation (14). Finally, we calculate the second-order dif-
ferential of (15) with respect to qi to obtain
∂2E[pii()]
∂(qi)2
= − 2
m
− c (19)
which is always negative. Thus, the second-order sufficiency condition is also
satisfied, implying that the profile of quantities (qˆi)ni=1 satisfying (14) solves the
maximization problem of each firm, constituting a Nash equilibrium. 
Let qˆ = E[]/(n + 1 + mc). From (14), qˆi = qˆ for all i. So, the equilibrium
output of the industry must be equal to
Qˆ = nqˆ =
nE[]
n+ 1 +mc
. (20)
Using (11) and (20), we can then calculate for any realization of  the corre-
sponding market clearing price:
pˆ() =
1
m
(
− nE[]
n+ 1 +mc
)
(21)
It follows that for any realization of  the realized profits of each firm are equal
to
pˆi() = pˆ()qˆ − cqˆ2/2 = 
m
E[]
n+ 1 +mc
− n/m+ c/2
(n+ 1 +mc)
2 (E[])
2. (22)
It is easy to check that the expected profits of each firm will then be equal to
E[pˆi()] =
2 +mc
2m
(E[])2
(n+ 1 +mc)
2 . (23)
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5 Results
Below, we will investigate the possibility that the supply function competition
with demand uncertainty may be ex-ante more desirable than the stochastic
Cournot competition. To this aim, we calculate a threshold for the demand
uncertainty above which the supply competition always becomes superior to
the stochastic Cournot competition with respect to the expected equilibrium
profits. First note that
E[2] = (E[])2
[
1 +
(
σ()
E[]
)2 ]
, (24)
where σ() denotes the standard deviation of  under the density f(). In the
above equation, the ratio σ()/E[] is known as the coefficient of variation, which
is a unitless measure of relative variability. Moreover, it is independent of the
realization of . Let us denote this ratio by CV. Then, (24) can be rewritten as
E[2] = (E[])2
[
1 + CV2 ] . (25)
Now, using (25) we can rewrite equation (10), which identifies the expected
equilibrium profits of each firm under the supply function competition with
demand uncertainty:
E[p¯i()] =
α
(nα+m)2
(
1− cα
2
) (
1 + CV2) (E[])2. (26)
Let us denote by CV∗ the value of the coefficient of variation at which the ex-
pected equilibrium profits obtained -under demand uncertainty- in the Cournot
competition and in the supply function competition become equal. By equating
equations (23) and (26), this value can be calculated as:
CV∗ =
√
(2 +mc) (nα+m)
2
αm (2− cα) (n+ 1 +mc)2 − 1, (27)
where α satisfies (6).
When the coefficient of variation in demand, CV, is above (below) the thresh-
old value CV∗, the supply function competition leads to higher (lower) expected
profits for each firm than the stochastic Cournot competition. Also, as it should
be apparent from (27) along with (6), the threshold CV∗ depends on various at-
tributes of the industry structure, involving the number of firms, n, the slope of
the demand curve, m, and the cost of producing a unit output, c. Below, we will
explore how these attributes affect CV∗. However, due to the complex analytical
form of CV∗(c,m, n), characterized by equation (27) along with (6), we conduct
our comparative statics analysis with the help of a computer graphics program.
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Figure 1. Plots of the coefficient of variation threshold CV∗(c,m, n).
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Specifically, we change the demand slope parameter m in the set {1/81, 1/27,
1/9, 1/3, 1, 3}, and for each value of m we plot the graph of CV∗ as a function
of n and c, when n takes 15 integer values between 2 and 30 and c takes 15 real
values between 0.01 and 30.00. These graphs are drawn in Figure 1, illustrating
that the threshold value of the coefficient of variation, CV∗, is always positive
for all considered values of m, n, and c. Of course, this is not surprising since an
observation with CV∗ = 0 would be in contradiction with Klemperer and Meyer
(1989) who showed that in the absence of any (demand) uncertainty (i.e., when
CV = 0), the profits from the supply function competition must be always below
the profits from the Cournot competition.
Figure 1 also illustrates that an increase in the slope of the demand curve,
m, reduces the threshold value of the coefficient of variation, CV∗, at all values
of n and c in their domains. Similarly, the cost parameter c has a a negative
impact on CV∗ at all values of m and n in their domains. On the other hand, the
number of firms n is found to have a positive effect on CV∗ for all values of m
and c. As a matter of fact, this effect becomes larger when the cost parameter
c is not very high.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have formalized an insight of Klemperer and Meyer (1989) that
the outcome of the supply function competition with demand uncertainty may
be more desirable for the firms in the oligopolistic industry than the outcome of
the stochastic Cournot competition, and showed how this desirability is affected
by some attributes of the industry structure.
In particular, we have found that the higher the slope of the industry de-
mand curve or the higher the cost of producing a unit output or the smaller
the number of firms in the industry, the more likely that at any given level of
demand uncertainty the supply function competition will bring higher expected
profits than the stochastic Cournot competition in equilibrium. We should note
that both an increase in the slope of the demand curve and an increase in the
production cost of a unit output would result in a decrease in the potential (max-
imal) social surplus that could be attained in a perfectly competitive industry.
Given this fact, our findings suggest that when the potential social surplus in
the industry -some part of which the oligopolistic firms can expect to extract
when they compete in quantities or in supply functions- is sufficiently small, the
supply function competition with demand uncertainty would become -from the
viewpoints of firms- inferior to the stochastic Cournot competition only when
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the size of the demand uncertainty is also sufficiently low. On the other hand,
when the number of firms in the industry is not sufficiently small, the supply
function competition with demand uncertainty can become a superior mode of
competition only at very high levels of uncertainties.
All in all, our findings reveal that whether the Cournot or the supply function
competition can yield better outcomes for the oligopolistic firms under demand
uncertainty depends on the relative size of this uncertainty (as measured by the
coefficient of variation in demand), with respect to the size of the market and
the number of competitors.
References
Cournot A (1838) Recherches sur les Principes Mathematiques de la Theorie
des Richesses. Paris
Delgado J (2006) Coalition-proof supply function equilibria under capacity con-
straints. Economic Theory 29:219–229
Delgado J, Moreno D (2004) Coalition-proof supply function equilibria in oligo-
poly. Journal of Economic Theory 114:231–254
Grossman S (1981) Nash equilibrium and the industrial organization of markets
with large fixed costs. Econometrica 49:1149–1172
Klemperer PD, Meyer MA (1989) Supply function equilibria in oligopoly under
uncertainty. Econometrica 57:1243–1277
Kro´l M (2017) On the equivalence of quantity competition and supply function
competition with sunk costs. International Journal Game Theory 46:475–486
Nash J (1950) Equilibrium points in n-person games. Proceedings of the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences 36:48–49
11
